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Abstract
This paper examines the interaction between monetary and budgetary policy. A comparison
of the dynamic responses in diﬀerent exchange rate regimes oﬀers an assessment of the monetary
union case. The analysis proceeds on an SVAR-common trends model. In its current speciﬁca-
tion, we can only infer responses to the budgetary policy shock. Its identiﬁcation is obtained
by imposing a (long term) solvency condition on government accounts, exploiting automatic
stabilisation responses of government revenues, and the imposition of the Fisher relationship.
Two main conclusions emerge. Budgetary policy shocks indirectly lead to monetary tightening.
Such eﬀects are signiﬁcant in countries with ﬂexible exchange rate regimes only. Second, policy
regime shifts are important.
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
With the creation of EMU, a new macroeconomic regime has been installed. The prime aim of
the ECB is to maintain price stability and - only in a second line - to support general economic
objectives. A multitude of national budgetary authorities is bound by the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). The rules of the Pact comprise the use of automatic stabilisers around structurally sound
ﬁscal positions, close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. EMU aﬀects many structural
aspects of the European economies. In addition, the transmission channels and eﬀectiveness of both
monetary and budgetary policy are bound to change in the EMU environment. Moreover, responses
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1to macroeconomic conditions will depend on the interaction between both demand side policies.
The reciprocal eﬀects between multiple budgetary authorities further complicate this picture. Such
a complex interplay of factors will determine stabilisation outcomes.
The policy tasks assigned to monetary and budgetary authorities in the EMU are based on
long term considerations, reﬂecting the stability culture in which the Maastricht Treaty was signed
(Wyplosz, 2002). The prophecy that the new regime would be a ”fair weather” arrangement, seems
to become true (Alesina et al., 2001) however. The demise of the SGP and the recurrent concern
on (national) inﬂation outcomes, reveals concerns by policy makers about short term stabilisation,
willing to use the budgetary tool. This raises the question of what the interaction between monetary
and budgetary authorities will look like in a monetary union.
We therefore examine the interactive behaviour of monetary and budgetary policy and its de-
pendency on the monetary regime explicitly. The basic idea is to explore the conduct of budgetary
policy in countries that were part of a quasi-monetary union through a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
It thereby contributes to the literature in two major ways: (1) methodologically, a common trends
structural VAR in output, inﬂation and the policy instruments let us impose as few a priori restric-
tions as possible to identify monetary and budgetary policy shocks; (2) by testing for the importance
of monetary regimes in budgetary policy behaviour. The current version of the paper only examines
the eﬀects of non-systematic budgetary policy on monetary policy. The main result is the positive
eﬀect on interest rates of budgetary policy shocks. The impact is not direct however, but passes
via the positive output and inﬂation responses. Another major ﬁnding is the importance of policy
regimes shifts.These results provide another angle to assess the behaviour of ﬁscal policy in the ﬁrst
years of EMU. Obviously, any such extrapolation runs foul of the Lucas critique, and we point at
some diﬀerences with EMU when suggesting empirical and theoretical extensions to present research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a succinct overview of the theoretical
literature on interaction (and policy coordination), based on the holistic approach of the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level. It then appraises existing empirical evidence on interaction and its
dependence on the monetary regime. This and a brief event study on the second moments of
stabilisation policies justify the subsequent analysis. The econometric set up of the common trends
model and the application to our analysis is discussed in Section 3. The argument focuses in
particular on the identiﬁcation and the interpretation of the structural shocks. Section 4 analyses
the results on interaction. Robustness of the empirical approach is checked along diﬀerent lines.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
22 LITERATURE REVIEW: STABILISATION, BUDGETARY
POLICY AND THE MONETARY REGIME
2.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Probably the most comprehensive approach towards the interaction of monetary and budgetary
policy is found in the ﬁscal theory of the price level (henceforth FTPL). It suggests that if the ﬁscal
authorities fail to take actions to ensure their intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed, equilibria
a r ep o s s i b l ew h e r eﬁscal - rather than monetary - policy determines the price level (Wren-Lewis,
2002). The possibility of a non-Ricardian regime arises as government solvency eventually has to
be ensured in real terms. This leads to an active ﬁscal policy to which monetary policy can only
passively adjust. Such a scenario may not be realistic, both for theoretical1 and practical reasons.
A Ricardian regime was guaranteed by the monetary dominance of the Bundesbank in the EMS.
Likewise, the SGP now safeguards the ECB (Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002). EMU adds
ad i s t i n c tﬂavour though, as the concern has shifted from long term stability to the conduct of
stabilisation policies in a monetary union (Fatas and Mihov, 2002).
Let us consider the issue of stabilisation ﬁrst. Departures of the basic FTPL models which
introduce nominal inertia and Blanchard-Yaari consumers, justify a role for short term stabilisation
policy which may still be consistent with an active monetary policy (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2001).
T h en a t u r eo fﬁscal policy - active or passive - is thereby irrelevant. However, while stabilisation
policy and solvency may be compatible, the combination is not necessarily credible. In particular,
with budgetary policy now having eﬀects on both inﬂation and output, a time inconsistency problem
arises which is very much alike the one encountered in monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
This gives rise to a conﬂict with long term solvency of government debt2. The SGP may then be
considered as an incomplete answer to this trade-oﬀ. Putting a ceiling on positive deﬁcit deviations
may ensure budgetary policy is locally Ricardian. However, this does not rule out debt implosions
and - more importantly - unduly restrains the use of budgetary policy. In other words, more short
term budgetary ﬂexibility is possible without endangering solvency (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000).
A more common framework to consider policy interaction is established in the growing literature
on micro-founded general equilibrium models of sticky prices, which may be considered as a subset of
the FTPL models. Optimal monetary and budgetary policy is derived under alternative assumptions
of the settings of the interaction process (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001). That is, the exact timing
and the discretionary or commitment character of policy need to be determined.
Both approaches thus stress the importance of the institutional set up. Such policy games can
be analysed in much simpler models however. A series of papers have examined the game theoretic
1The FTPL is not without controversy however and its relevance is still being questioned. In particular, the
existence of equilibria that may never be attained in reality is contentious (Buiter, 1999).
2The proposal of an independent ﬁscal stabilisation agency (Wyplosz, 2002) has to be seen in this light.
3interaction of monetary and budgetary policy. In these small models, optimal policy instrument
setting is found by minimising loss functions in the policymakers’ targets, subject to the economy’s
aggregate demand and supply constraints where price stickiness is generally assumed (Dixit and
Lambertini, 2001b). The essential message of these models is that the Nash equilibrium entails non-
cooperative races (”leadership battles”) between both policymakers whenever there are conﬂicts on
the policy objectives. This results in an unbalanced policy mix. The solution to this coordination
failure is to instil one of both authorities with leadership3. Such models justify constraints on ﬁscal
policy as monetary commitment to low inﬂation can be destroyed by budgetary discretion (Dixit and
Lambertini, 2000). The standard argument thereby is that the spending and inﬂation bias result
from a lack of commitment not to use inﬂation to alleviate tax distortions. This does not seem to
create a rationale for ”positive” policy coordination then4.
Nevertheless, the analysis so far focuses on the interaction of a single monetary and a single bud-
getary actor. Key to understand the EMU framework is the interaction between a single monetary
authority and multiple budgetary authorities in open economies. This inevitably involves a discus-
sion on the interaction of budgetary authorities. Some papers have analysed the relevance of the
FTPL in the context of a monetary union. For a two-country model, the basic result conveys that it
is suﬃcient to have one insolvent government in the union to determine the price level for the union
as a whole (Canzoneri et al., 2001). Thereby, ﬁscal solvency can not be guaranteed for any other
government in the monetary union5. In the presence of rigidities, it is the relative strength of the
ﬁscal feedback parameters that determine whether the regime is Ricardian or not. The justiﬁcation
for the SGP is now somewhat diﬀerent: by ensuring solvency of each government in the union, the
possibility that one country sets the price level is ruled out. Beetsma and Jensen (2002) construct
a multiple country version of a micro-founded model with sticky prices, to which ﬁscal policy is
added. The speciﬁcation allows tracking the reaction of all variables to shocks in both policies. The
crucial point of the model is that diﬀerences in price rigidities across member states of the monetary
union cause the single monetary policy to have diverse eﬀects on the output gap and inﬂation in
distinct countries. This induces a diﬀerent degree of budgetary policy variability across countries. In
particular, in the presence of an asymmetric supply shock in one country, budgetary policies in the
other countries expand to oﬀset the desinﬂationary impact of the central bank’s interest rate rise.
The net eﬀect of these countries’ unilateral spending boost, is the central bank now having to ﬁght
inﬂationary pressures (Uhlig, 2002). The underlying reason is free riding between the budgetary
authorities.
Can the free riding problem be overcome by a closer coordination? Coordination of monetary and
3In this respect, the implications of the game theoretic models are very similar to those of the FTPL. Leadership
may be considered as the enforcement of behaviour on the other policymaker.
4However, with the same basic model ingredients, Buti et al. (2001) show that coordination may be beneﬁcial in
the presence of supply shocks.
5Except in the particular case where this price level would be exactly right for the other countries in the union.
4budgetary policy receives little theoretical support. As Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002) show, the ﬁrst
best may as well be achieved by optimal domestic policy setting. In addition, there are arguments
based on political economy and on game-theoretic interactions between policy makers which render
coordination suboptimal (Persson and Tabellini, 1995). As cooperation necessarily entails a further
degree of cooperation between budgetary authorities, leadership may shift to budgetary policy.
Inﬂationary policies may then be the result. Non-cooperation actually suﬃces to discipline budgetary
policy in a monetary union and is therefore welfare-improving (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2001). An
even stronger result holds: the indirect eﬀects of free riding budgetary authorities on the common
monetary policy may give incentives to each government to push for budgetary constraints (Beetsma
and Uhlig, 1999). From a practical point of view, the diﬀerent nature of monetary and ﬁscal policy
makes ﬁne-tuned cooperation probably unfeasible. Such operational problems apply both to joint
monetary - ﬁscal policy setting, as to closer budgetary cooperation. To summarize the arguments,
theoretical evidence on the welfare losses of (non-)coordination is not clear cut. Probably, the
conclusion of this literature is that properly designed institutions - rather than ”ad hoc” coordination
-g oal o n gw a yt o w a r d saﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m ei nm o n e t a r yu n i o n .
2.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE and EVENT STUDY
The literature on interaction of monetary and budgetary policy has largely remained theoretical.
Assessing whether the macroeconomic regime of EMU is making a diﬀerence in terms of stabilisation
policies is hard with little more than three years of evidence (Fatas and Mihov, 2002). One may thus
want to look for a lever to examine the dependency of joint monetary and budgetary policy setting.
We propose to contrast macroeconomic stabilisation and budgetary policy conduct in countries that
maintained a ﬂexible respectively a ﬁxed exchange rate over a prolonged period of time. This is as
close as we can get to a (quasi-)monetary union.
To that end, we perform a small event study of budgetary policy behaviour and stabilisation
outcomes before and after ﬁxing the exchange rate. Attaching a particular period to this choice is
a contentious issue. The former oﬃcial IMF classiﬁcation - based on country reporting - is unable
to distinguish between oﬃcial and factual exchange rate policies. In particular, should one regard
frequent devaluations to an anchor currency as managed ﬂoating e.g. the ”soft” ERM period 1979-
1989? Conversely, a period of exchange rate stability may be more accurately described as a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, even if it oﬃcially moved within very wide bands or was only informally
pegged e.g. the post-EMS crisis period. We therefore disregard the oﬃcial ”Annual Report” of the
IMF, and adopt the historical de facto classiﬁcation of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002) instead. It is
based on a variety of descriptive statistics on oﬃcial and parallel exchange rates, and the use of
multiple exchange rates. As it is not so clear how to categorise the ”soft” ERM period, we also base
our decision on the study of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). They perform a cluster analysis
on various volatility measures of oﬃcial exchange rate and international reserves, to sort regimes.
5E r r a t i cs w i t c h e sb e t w e e nr e g i m e si n d i c a t et ou san o n - ﬁxed period. Our classiﬁcation can be found
in Table 1 of Appendix B.
With this categorisation, we ﬁrst compute standard deviations of the output gap, inﬂation and
the net government lending ratio for the diﬀerent countries/regimes. Figure 1 (Appendix C) displays
the cross-sectional standard deviation for the three series at leads and lags relative to the indexed
period 0. If anything, ﬁxing the exchange rate seems to favour macroeconomic stability, without
requiring more budgetary intervention. A closer examination of the results on a country basis does
not change the picture. Table 2 shows that the reduction in inﬂation and output gap volatility
is substantial, even for countries that ﬁxed their exchange rate early. Setting this oﬀ against the
experience of ﬂoating countries, the fall is even more pronounced. The budget deﬁcit is largely
unaﬀected and has even become more volatile for two large countries (Germany and Spain), but also
two small countries (Belgium and the Netherlands).
These results do not properly reﬂect what we would like to examine however. First, they are
strongly inﬂuenced by the convergence eﬀorts in the transition to EMU (Fatas and Mihov, 2002).
We would like to abstract from any exogenous (or endogenous) macroeconomic disciplinary eﬀect
of ﬁxed exchange rates6. Exchange rate pegging not only serves as a nominal anchor, but may
also be a commitment mechanism for budgetary discipline. Second, the stabilisation response to
asymmetric shocks is of more importance, so we need to remove aggregate cyclical eﬀects. Third,
the cross-country standard deviations are based on diﬀerent sample sizes. Consequently, we compute
procentual deviations from EU averages for the three series under study7, and set country standard
deviations relative to this average before and after ﬁxing. The values in Table 3 tell a slightly
diﬀerent story now. Output gap volatility still decreases, but in those countries inﬂation with the
longest history of ﬁxing the exchange rate (Austria, France and Netherlands) volatility has increased
now. On the other hand, inﬂation volatility has gone up, but not in the Mediterranean countries, as
one would expect. Rather, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and again the Netherlands are responsible for
this increase. Finally, the budget deﬁcit has become more volatile in Finland, Portugal, Germany
and Spain. Still, in the latter two countries, it has converged to the European average from a low
initial value.
The interpretation of this descriptive exercise is too simplistic, even if it gives some interesting
insights. First, the interpretation is necessarily imprecise. The breakpoint classiﬁcation may not
be relevant. Also, we only partially try to isolate asymmetric shocks. But we cannot unambigu-
ously distinguish between the types of shocks that hit these countries. I.e. we do not assess the
(a)symmetry and the relative importance of demand versus supply shocks. In addition, permanent
and transitory ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation are not distinguished. Second, we can assess the
correlation of stabilisation outcomes and policies only. We cannot infer whether economic shocks
6The present event study is inspired on the analysis of Gavin and Perotti (1997) . These authors consider ﬁrst
moments of several budgetary indicators at exchange rate regime switches in Latin-American countries.
7Where the EU average is a real GDP weighted average (with weights based on a moving average of 4 years).
6have become more pronounced, or whether (non-)systematic budgetary policy has become more
erratic. Or a combination of both at the same time. The logical consequence is to move to more
advanced econometric techniques.
Few empirical papers tackle the issue of interaction explicitly. In particular, only recently has the
joint modelling of monetary and ﬁscal policy reaction functions been highlighted as both a method-
ological improvement and as an empirical test of the largely theoretical policy coordination literature
(Favero, 2002). Simultaneous estimation of a system of monetary and - less common - budgetary
Taylor rules has extended traditions in the policy rule literature8. A consistent result for panels
of OECD and EU countries is the evidence of systematic policy substitutability (Wyplosz, 1999;
Mélitz, 2000). While this is not so alarming for any individual country, it does question the reaction
of multiple budgetary authorities to a single monetary policy (Buti et al., 2002)9.I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,
for the country with a ﬂexible exchange rate regime in these panels (Germany), all papers point
at complementarity between authorities. Other results (Claeys, 2001) demonstrate that monetary
policy is not systematically reactive to budgetary policy in Germany, Japan and the United States
but is oﬀsetting in the European countries under study. The budgetary reaction function displays
noteworthy cross-country diﬀerences too. In the European countries with monetary dependence on
Germany, budgetary policy acts as a substitute and is signiﬁcantly reactive to inﬂation. Conversely,
in the anchor country of the EMS, the government budget is tightened in response to monetary
contraction, but not to inﬂationary bursts10. Nevertheless, even the reaction function approach is
only able to examine the mutual systematic policy responses. The ”ad hoc” nature of the reac-
tion functions may blur the results, as the mechanisms that link inﬂation, interest rates and debt
are not made explicit. In addition, one may want to introduce the way interaction between mone-
tary and budgetary authorities occurs: are reactions truly systematic, or do policymakers react to
non-systematic policy shocks?
These criticisms suggest the use of the complementary approach to policy reaction functions, viz.
structural VARs (henceforth SVAR). While the literature on the eﬀects of monetary policy in the
SVAR framework has abounded over the last decade, attention to the eﬀects of budgetary policy has
only recently received attention (Blanchard and Perotti, 1999). While the inclusion of budgetary
policy in a monetary SVAR has basically been neglected, empirical research on budgetary policy has
gradually started to include price variables based on Sims’ (1988) conjecture that the presence of
these jump variables may embody expectations of changes in budgetary policy. By absorbing some
8Policy interaction is introduced by mutual inclusion of the other policy instrument.
9Von Hagen et al. (2001) detect a complementary reaction of systematic monetary to budgetary policy however,
while Wyplosz (1999) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant response at all.
10A related approach can be found in Favero (2002) who constructs a small-scale model for the four large EMU-
countries. Dynamic simulations show that deviations by ﬁscal authorities from systematic behaviour do not change
the behaviour of monetary policy. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002) take a complementary approach by as-
sessing the correlation of the non-systematic monetary and budgetary shocks from their separately estimated reaction
functions for all EU-countries. Convergence of monetary policy shocks is apparent, but coordination of ﬁscal and
monetary shocks, both within and across countries, is absent.
7of the future eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, larger scale VARs may reveal muted responses of macroeco-
nomic variables to non-systematic budgetary shocks11. Also, exclusion of interest rates may lead to
aggregation of monetary and budgetary shocks if there are important systematic contemporaneous
relationships between both policies12.
On quarterly data for the USA, SVAR studies including output, inﬂation and monetary and
budgetary policy instruments provide inconclusive answers on the pattern of interaction. Weise
(1996) ﬁnds one way inﬂuence of Federal Funds rate shocks: deﬁcits decrease at ﬁrst but are loosened
afterwards. The speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation is questionable though. In contrast, decomposition
of the budget items in the semi-structural VAR and the identiﬁcation of diﬀerent type of budgetary
shocks in the agnostic SVAR approach, lead both Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002)
to the same inference: revenue shocks lead to higher interest rates. While consistent with policy
complementarity, reverse causation may underlie this stylised fact. The larger tax base of non-
labour income automatically translates into higher revenues. This is further endorsed by the positive
revenue response to a monetary tightening. Nevertheless, a small but signiﬁcant eﬀect remains after
controlling for monetary shocks in Mountford and Uhlig (2002). Puzzling interest rate behaviour
follows after spending shocks (Perotti, 2002). Mountford and Uhlig (2002) ﬁnd no responses to
deﬁcit and balanced budget shocks. Another hint at the possible inﬂuence of the monetary regime
follows from Perotti’s (2002) general conclusion that the eﬀects of budgetary policy have become
weaker after 1980. The author puts forward the Volcker shift in USA monetary policy, as illustrated
in Clarida et al. (2000).
What does evidence on European countries teach us? Comparable studies are few — due to data
availability on government accounts — but all emphasise the distinct pattern of policy interaction
in Germany. Again Perotti (2002) ﬁnds signiﬁcant interest rate falls after spending shocks in Ger-
many. With a methodology close to Perotti’s (2002), both Marcellino (2002) and Bruneau and De
Bandt (2003) ﬁnd more marked (and persistent) eﬀects in monetary policy reactions to budgetary
expenditure and revenue shocks in the large EMU-countries and EMU as a whole than in Germany
itself. As the former author correctly stresses, this response may be either direct or via the impact
on inﬂation and the output gap. No budgetary reaction seems to follow from monetary policy shocks
in Marcellino (2002), but budgetary loosening follows in all countries - except Germany - in Bruneau
and De Bandt (2003)13.Both papers restrict attention to the 1980-2001 sample period. The Euro-
pean countries under study have been characterised by diﬀerent monetary regimes over this period
however.
The simple longer term policy assignment that charges monetary policy with inﬂation stabilisa-
11Conversely, exclusion of ﬁscal variables might bias the evaluation of the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks.
12As Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and Perotti (2002) stress however, this control for monetary policy does not seem
to be important for assessing the eﬀects of budgetary policy on output.
13Note also that Marcellino (2002) is the only author to assess coordination explicitly by adding German budgetary
policy to the VAR speciﬁcation of the other countries. While the Bundesbank’s monetary dominance is obvious, this
is questionable for German budgetary policy though.
8tion and budgetary policy with output stabilisation14 might indeed break down in a macroeconomic
framework with a single monetary policy and decentralised budgetary authorities. In particular,
either of uncorrelated economic shocks, a non-zero weight attributed to inﬂation volatility by the
budgetary authority or diverging stabilisation preferences between monetary and budgetary policy,
is a suﬃcient condition to change budgetary policy behaviour. Ceteris paribus, we might there-
fore anticipate that in comparison to ﬂexible exchange rate regimes: (1) budgetary policy shocks
should have no impact on monetary policy; (2) monetary policy shocks result in more pronounced
budgetary responses. No paper has explicitly discussed the stylised facts on interaction in diﬀerent
monetary regimes15. The present paper is an attempt to ﬁll this gap by extending evidence on the
eﬀects of budgetary policy to small open economies with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, augmenting
the speciﬁcation with monetary policy. A consistent empirical methodology needs to account for the
ceteris paribus conditions. First, we need to condition upon the types of shocks that hit countries.
Assessing policy shocks in an SVAR is therefore a natural way to proceed. Subsequently, an exten-
sive analysis of the policy shocks should give insights in the policy interaction patterns. Second, the
dynamic analysis in an SVAR only holds under the condition that sytematic policy behaviour was
unaﬀected by changes in monetary regime. We test the stability of the parameters in the policy
reaction functions, inherent in the SVAR speciﬁcation. Some caveats have to be kept in mind in
the following analysis however. The Lucas critique not only holds on the reaction coeﬃcients in the
reaction function. Studies of small open economies with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes may indeed
shed light on policy interaction in EMU, where each country is small relative to the Union. Interac-
tion between budgetary policymakers (e.g. in the Euro group) may add an extra game theoretical
dimension to national budgetary reactions.
3 AN SVAR-COMMON TRENDS ANALYSIS
This Section ﬁrst discusses some equivalent representations for cointegrated data series and then
shows which restrictions are necessary to identify permanent and transitory shocks. Next, the
speciﬁcation of our SVAR is set out. A discussion of the identiﬁcation of the shocks through the
long term restrictions in the common trends model, relates our methodology to — and puts into a
critical perspective — the existing literature.
3.1 THE COMMON TRENDS METHODOLOGY
A common trends model decomposes time series into trends and stationary variables. Denoting by
 the time series under study, it is composed of permanent trends 
 , and a transitory stationary
14Either via the automatic stabilisers or some well considered discretionary intervention (Taylor, 2000; Wren-Lewis,
2002).
15The study that comes closest to this is the SVAR analysis of Dalsgaard and De Serres (1999). Speciﬁcation and
identiﬁcation are somehow peculiar and inconsistent across countries, which makes a comparison diﬃcult.
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Basically, the existence of  cointegrating relationships between the  variables, allows us to extract
the  ≡ − permanent components, as driven by the  common stochastic trends. An equivalent
way to write  then is Eq.(2)
 = 0 +z + Φ()  ∼ 	(0
 ) (2)
where it has been assumed that Φ() is ﬁnite for all  in and on the unit circle, and 0 is stationary.
The trend component is then described by z,w h e r ez is the loading matrix on the permanent
components and of dimension ∗ and rank ,a n d is a random walk with drift 
 and innovation
 as in Eq.(3).
 = 
 +−1 +  ∼ 	(0
) (3)
Hence, the common trends model gives us the decomposition of the time series (1) in Eq.(4).
½ 
 = 0 +Φ()







When the number of  common trends is less than the number  of variables, there are exactly
 =  −  linearly independent cointegrating vectors (let them be collected in  as in the usual
notation). As these are orthogonal to the loading matrix z,t h ep r o c e s s
0 is jointly stationary.
In particular, when  is generated by a VAR with lag length  as in Eq.(5)
() =  +  ∼ 	(0
Σ) (5)
and assuming that  is cointegrated of order (1,1) with  cointegrating vectors, then we know
from the Representation Theorem that [(1)] =  and (1) = 
0 with  the loading matrix
of adjustment coeﬃcients on the  cointegrating vectors. Equation (5) can be rewritten then as a
VECM (Eq. (6))
∗()∆ =  −
















there exists a Wold VMA representation of Eq.(6) as in (8)
∆ =  +() (8)









 ( ≥ 0). In that case we
obtain the following common trends representation of the VAR(p) process Eq.(9)
½ 
 = 0 +∗()






where (1) has reduced rank  under the assumption of  cointegrating vectors, or in other words,
only  elements of (1) result in independent permanent eﬀects on . Warne (1993) derives a
general estimation strategy based on (6) and the Wold VMA representation as in Eq.(8). Hereupon,
the asymptotic properties of the impulse response functions (IRF) — and the forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVD) — of the  variables to permanent and transitory innovations are deduced
under the dual hypothesis of a known ﬁnite upper bound on the lag order and no misspeciﬁcation
of the VAR.
The general identiﬁcation strategy in the common trends model can be described as follows. Call
Γ any regular matrix of dimension ∗ such that ΓΣΓ0 is diagonal. Then (1) ≡ (1)Γ−1 is the total
impact matrix. Let 	 be the i-th component of the vector Γ.T h em a t r i xΓ is said to identify the
common trends model (Eq.(9)) when: (a) Γ is uniquely determined from the parameters in Eq.(6);
(b) the covariance matrix ofΓ is diagonal with non-zero diagonal elements; and (c) the total
impact matrix(1 ) = [ z
. . . 0 ]. The i nnova ti on i s ca te go ri se d as tra nsi to ry (p er ma n ent ) i f c o lu m n 
( ∈ {1

}) of (1) is (non-)zero or in other words, permanent innovations are associated to the
 common trends. Hence, the reduced form VMA representation in expression (8) is equivalent to
the structural model (Eq.(10))
∆ =  +() (10)
where  contains the serially uncorrelated structural disturbances with mean zero and with covari-
ance matrix .
In practice, after having established the cointegrating rank , we need to determine the coin-
tegrating vectors . These may either be obtained via the usual estimation techniques or can be
directly imposed from the steady state properties of some economic theory. This associates the
cointegrating vectors to the  transitory innovations and thus imposes ∗  identifying restrictions.
In a second step, we calculate the matrix of common trend parameters using the orthogonality of
the cointegrating vectors to the permanent components to . Following King et al. (1991), we may
write z = z0. Then, having 
0z0 =0results in a further  ∗  restrictions. However, these
restrictions do not attribute any particular economic meaning to the  trends. We therefore need
 ∗ additional assumptions to isolate  unique (and economically interpretable) trends. Assuming
that the permanent shocks are uncorrelated and satisfy a (Choleski) ordering on their reciprocal
inﬂuence16,g i v e su s
(+1)
2 further restrictions. Finally, at least
(−1)
2 additional constraints on the
16That is,  is lower triangular.
11eﬀect of permanent shocks on the variables included in the model need be motivated by economic
t h e o r y .E s t i m a t i o nt h e np r o c e e d so nt h eV E C M( E q . ( 6 ) ) .
3.2 SPECIFICATION
We specify a VAR in (log) levels of real GDP ( ),i n ﬂation (!), a short term nominal interest rate ()
and (log) levels of real government expenditure (") and revenues (#).R e a lo u t p u t  and inﬂation
! can be considered as the policy objectives of both monetary and budgetary authorities17,w h e r e a s
the interest rate and the budget items are the sole respectively dual policy instruments to achieve
these. A priori, three lags are included in the VAR18.H e n c e ,o u rm o d e lf o rt h eD G Pc a nb ew r i t t e n





where  =[ !"#]0.
 (11)
DATA (see Appendix A) All data are on a semi-annual frequency, as in Dalsgaard
and De Serres (1999), Favero (2002) and Marcellino (2002). This rather unusual choice reﬂects two
trade-oﬀs. First, the joint modelling of monetary and budgetary policy leads to an intermediate
choice of data frequency. Monetary decisions are taken at a much higher frequency. Given the
rather high degree of interest rate smoothing found in the literature on Taylor rules (Clarida et al.,
1998), this measure is probably not too coarse. In contrast, budgetary policy is legislatively set at an
annual frequency. Yet, discretionary semestral revisions are not unusual and stabilisation responses
are automatic. Whereas the latter eﬀect mainly inﬂuences government revenues, the former mainly
involves expenditure adjustments (Van den Noord, 2002). Secondly, this frequency enables us to
include a relatively large set of countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, which have not been
i n c l u d e di np r e v i o u sr e s e a r c h19. The sampling periods for the diﬀerent countries has not been ﬁxed:
the inital period varies between the mid 1960s to mid 1970s and the sample ends in 2001:2 (Table
4).
Essential to the identiﬁcation procedure is the construction of the budgetary instruments. Cycli-
cally sensitive budget items have been assembled in government revenues (#).I . e .a si nB l a n c h a r d
and Perotti (1999), they include tax revenues net of transfers. On the other hand, net capital expen-
diture — which is mainly related to interest payments on outstanding debt — is added to government
consumption20. The main reason for its inclusion is theoretical: governments need to satisfy the
17Strictly speaking, a loss function would specify this in terms of deviations from target output (∗) and target
inﬂation (∗). This is implicit in the empirical model.
18This was subsequently conﬁrmed by lag order criteria tests on most speciﬁcations.
19These countries are: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the United
States.
20This expenditure category may be cyclically sensitive however, but this eﬀect seems sizeable in high debt countries
only.
12intertemporal government budget constraint. Also, government investment has not been included
for it may have long term productive eﬀects that may obscure the identiﬁcation of shocks.
IDENTIFICATION We suppose three cointegration relations may be present in the
DGP of  =[ !"#]0, to which we associate the three temporary shocks:
1. "−# (”Solvency condition”) The intertemporal government budget constraint
(IGBC) requires that any shock to government expenditure must be oﬀset by opposing rev-
enue measures in order to satisfy solvency i.e. future real primary surpluses can be foreseen
to be suﬃcient to repay all existent and future real debt. Under some weak economic assump-
tions, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the IGBC shows that the cointegration relation between the I(1)
variables government expenditures " and revenues #,w i t hr e s p e c t i v ec o e ﬃcients [1
1]0 is a
necessary condition for the IGBC to hold. This concept of strong sustainability implies that
the undiscounted public debt is ﬁnite in the long run; or equivalently that the primary deﬁcit
series is stationary21. This leads us to interpret the underlying structural innovation as the
budgetary shock. Three remarks are necessary at this point. First, we only test for weak
sustainability in the empirical strategy, thereby leaving the cointegration vector unspeciﬁed22.
Second, budgetary shocks are supposed to have no long term eﬀect on other variables. Having
taken out government investment of the budget, this seems not too controversial. Third, this
speciﬁcation does not allow to assess the eﬀects of balanced budget shocks as they are neutral
by deﬁnition.
2.   + $# (”Automatic stabilisation”) In the countries that we consider, government
absorbs a relatively constant share of output23. The cointegration relation between government
revenues and real output must then be due to business cycle shocks, the nature of which
we leave unspeciﬁed. It thus allows us to take out the automatic stabilisation properties of
the government budget and simultaneously isolates temporary economic shocks. One further
remark on the identifcation of the budgetary shocks should be made at this point. We are not
only unable to distinguish between shocks to expenditures and revenues. By tying down # to  ,
it is implicitly assumed that budget shocks are driven by expenditure shocks " whereas there
is no immediate response of revenues. This assumption is not unreasonable if one considers the
political economy of budget processing though: " is determined ﬁrst and taxes set accordingly
(Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998)24.
3. −! (”Fisher condition”) The real interest rate is constante, or nominal interest
rates and inﬂation are cointegrated. Through this relation, we derive short term shocks to the
21For empirical tests of government solvency using this criterion, see Ahmed and Rogers (1995).
22Even if we implicitly impose some structure by including interest payments in government expenditures.
23The clear exception is Spain.
24It is also consistent with the evidence in SVAR speciﬁcations that allow for endogenous responses of both expen-
diture and revenues.
13real interest rate. This is an admittedly contentious identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks25.
More extensive identiﬁcation schemes are currently being investigated26. It nevertheless allows
us to isolate any short term inﬂationary eﬀects of budgetary shocks. Hence, responses in the
interest rate to budgetary shocks may be attributed to monetary policy.
With  =5variables and  =3cointegration relations, we have already speciﬁed 15 parameters
in the cointegration vectors. A further 6 restrictions come from the orthogonality of the three
cointegration vectors to the  =2common trends. Uncorrelatedness and a causal ordering of
the permanent shocks gives us 3 more restrictions, which leaves 1 restriction to be imposed. In
accordance with the existing literature (King et al., 1991), we interpret the permanent components
as a real and a nominal common trend respectively. We distinguish both by assuming the nominal
trend has no long term eﬀect on real output.
VALIDITY OF AND CRITICISM ON THE COMMON TRENDS MODEL Any
SVAR analysis needs to impose at least  ∗  identifying restrictions. Limiting the discussion to
the budgetary policy literature27, all of the methods that have been adopted towards identiﬁcation,
have tried to overcome two major diﬃculties: (a) how to handle anticipation eﬀects, which may be
particularly relevant for budgetary policy; (b) how to avoid being too ”dogmatic”, bringing to bear
on the data extensive external information or strong theoretical priors28.
The narrative approach requires historical information on distinct periods of budgetary shocks.
These may not be entirely unanticipated however. Besides, the approach is not really useful for
the analysis of interaction. Choleski ordering assumes some prior beliefs on the exogeneity and
the mutual inﬂuence of the variables in the system. Semi-structural VARs use decision lags and
require institutional information on the elasticity of ﬁscal variables to output. The latter aspect is
not unsolvable, but requires a substantial amount of external information and the estimation — and
consequent imposition of — a number of parameters29 (Blanchard and Perotti, 1999). In quarterly
data sets, lag restrictions avoid to some extent anticipation eﬀects but would not capture these
completely if implementation lags are important. The agnostic identiﬁcation approach of Mountford
and Uhlig (2002) imposes sign restrictions on the impulse responses only, and infers thereupon
diﬀerent types of budgetary shocks. It can thereby fully account for anticipation eﬀects, but can
25We also considered introducing a Taylor type relation between nominal interest rates, inﬂation and output as in
Hendry and Doornik (1994). The stationary residuals could then be considered as monetary policy shocks. However,
the inclusion of a trend is then necessary. Also, the long term relation may be compatible with other interpretations,
such as a basic IS-curve. In both cases, this may obscure the identifcation of the other shocks.
26The inclusion of real balances is considered so as to obtain a long term money demand relation.
27But similar approaches and problems arise in the monetary policy literature. For a comprehensive overview, see
Christiano et al. (2000).
28This paragraph is based on the discussion in Perotti (2002).
29In small samples, this may create numerical accuracy problems. Marcellino (2002) checks and conﬁrms convergence
to a global optimum and robustness of the IRFs, for diﬀerent starting values of the initial parameters.
14not avoid being dogmatic: assumptions are needed precisely on the eﬀects of the shocks on those
variables we are interested in.
There are basically two reasons for us adopting long term restrictions. First, imposing long
term restrictions is novel in the literature on budgetary policy eﬀects and policy interaction. To
our knowledge, only two papers have adopted a similar approach before, both allowing for policy
i n t e r a c t i o ni na nS V A Ri no u t p u tg r o w t h ,i n ﬂation, a monetary variable and the budget deﬁcit30.
This approach has some potential beneﬁts. It does not restrict contemporaneous links and should
therefore be able to completely catch anticipation eﬀects31. In addition, short run responses are
completely left unspeciﬁed. To a certain degree, the method entails less dogmatic assumptions, as
these are mostly consistent with the steady state properties of a wide range of theories. A second
reason to justify this approach is more practical. As in Dalsgaard and De Serres (1999), the semi-
annual frequency of the data does not even permit us to base identiﬁcation on contemporaneous
relations.
Nevertheless, ”identiﬁcation in macroeconomics is a dirty business” (Faust and Leeper, 1997, p.
352). While both short and long term restrictions may be very sensitive to the exact parameter value
imposed (King and Watson, 1997; Sarte, 1999), long term restrictions suﬀer from two additional
problems (Faust and Leeper, 1997). First, even in large samples, substantial uncertainty surrounds
the estimates of the long term inverted MA representation in expression (8). Second, we extract a
limited number of shocks from the possibly large set of underlying shocks. This necessarily involves
a debatable linear aggregation over shocks and the problem of high frequency feedbacks. While the
former problem can be tackled by setting a priori the lag length, the latter is only partly solved by
an extension of the speciﬁcation. With semi-annual frequency data, this may be a problem indeed.
We do not test the robustness of the long term restriction of the nominal trend on output32.
However, by imposing a single restriction and letting the other long term restrictions be implicitly
determined by the properties of the DGP, inferential problems may have been reduced to a minimum.
This is another advantage of the common trends model. By specifying the models in levels and not
in growth rates, the cointegration properties based on a theoretical structure, let a large number of
identifying restrictions be self-imposed and thus let fully speak the data. All available information
is used, whereas a speciﬁcation in growth rates throws this information away. Finally, the minimal
set of speciﬁc restrictions should incorporate anticipatory eﬀects of budgetary policy.
We also anticipate other points of criticism that can be stated on the common trends model in
general and our speciﬁcation in particular.
• The economic interpretation of the permanent and the transitory innovations is not evident.
30Both also focus on European countries: Dalsgaard and De Serres (1999) impose 6 long term restrictions whereas
Bruneau and De Bandt (2003) achieve identiﬁcation by a combination of long and short term restrictions.
31And in particular so if price variables are added to the system (cfr. the Sims conjecture).
32This seems a very robust restriction anyway, as King and Watson (1997) demonstrate.
15• The VAR can suﬀer from misspeciﬁcation. We consider a set of open economies, but include
domestic variables only. Also, some European countries experienced important periods of
budgetary consolidation. Such non-linear eﬀects of budgetary policy may be hard to capture
i nal i n e a rf r a m e w o r ka saV A R .
• We deﬁne very general shocks to budgetary policy, but the identiﬁcation procedure can not be
extended to distinguish diﬀerent types of budgetary shocks.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Prior to the estimation and the dynamic analysis of the model, we ﬁrst need the establish the
following results33:
1. Unit root properties of the data series
based on ADF and KPSS tests, we conclude that all series in  =[ !"# ]0 can be
regarded as non-stationary for all countries34. Inconclusive border cases are assumed to be
I(1) series. In some cases, unit root tests assuming a structural break were necessary. The
corresponding dummy variabels are retained in the analysis35.
2. C o i n t e g r a t i n gr a n ko fV A R(Eq.(11))
Under the assumption of a trend orthogonal to the cointegrating relationships, both the Jo-
hansen trace and the Saikkonen and Lütkepohl test favour a cointegrating rank of 3 for most
countries (at a 5% signiﬁcance level). For Germany however, even with the inclusion of a shift
dummy as from 1990:2, the Saikkonen and Lütkepohl test detects a cointegrating rank of 2.
Surprisingly, in the full system for the United States, there is evidence of a single cointegrating
relationship only. Nevertheless, we continue with 3 cointegrating relations for all countries in
the further analysis. Two of these relations do stand in ﬁrm theoretical ground, the other has
a natural economic interpretation. This choice is broadly supported by evidence on each of
the presupposed long term relations separately.
The ”solvency” relation is not rejected under the assumption of a constant in the cointegrating
relation. Evidence is much weaker in Italy and the Netherlands however. Debt derailment in
these countries must be the underlying cause.
Our second equilibrium relation between real output and governement net revenues performs
relatively well. We allowed for a linear trend in the cointegration relation as the theoretical un-
derpinnings for why government absorption would be a constant fraction of output in steady
33Initial steps are performed in the time series programme JMulti. Estimation of the SVAR is done in RATS.
34The only exception to this are German, Austrian and Dutch interest rates.
35For Italy, a break in the nominal interest rate series related to the 1992 EMS-crisis was evident. German Re-
uniﬁcation led to a break in real output and government expenditure in 1990:2. For unclear reasons, an impulse
dummy was also necessary for Spain in 1978:1. The inclusion of impulse, respectively shift, dummies did not alter
the conclusions on the unit root properties.
16state are weak36. The existence of a long term relation then between government revenues
and real output, is only rejected for Canada37. Relatedly, we also tested whether government
spending is related to real output. With the exception of Austria, Italy and the Netherlands,
this was not the case38. Thus, we seem to have isolated automatic stabilisers.
Finally, the Fisher relation is not rejected in any country, with the exception of France.
3. Estimation of the cointegrating vectors 
the three cointegrating relations were estimated in the VECM (Eq. (6)) via maximum likeli-
hood, and the results used as input for the common trends model39.
4. Imposition of the long term restrictions
Identiﬁcation of the permanent innovations requires the imposition of parameter values on z0.
In order to identify the real trend in (Eq.(12)), a permanent supply shock on real output,
results in a corresponding ˆ $ long term increase in net revenues, where ˆ $ refers to the estimated
long run equilibrium coeﬃcient between   and #.T h e c o e ﬃcient ˆ %
 is then derived from
as i m p l eO L So f  + ˆ $# on ". Similarly, the coeﬃcients ˆ &
 and ˆ & are obtained from a











After these initial steps, the common trends model was estimated, the Wold VMA represen-
tation computed and the IRFs and FEVD — and their respective asymptotic standard errors
—c a l c u l a t e d .
4.1 BASIC RESULTS: INTERACTION
Results of the dynamic analysis are presented in Figs. 2a-i. The main result can be stated imme-
diately: budgetary shocks lead to increases in nominal interest rates. As there is no initial impact
on inﬂation, this must imply monetary policy contraction. However, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for
the European countries in the sample but Germany. The evidence thus largely conﬁrms Perotti’s
(2002) supposed absence of monetary policy reaction in ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. However, the
results must be qualiﬁed on two fronts40. First, the output response is not consistent across coun-
tries. While positive budget shocks do lead to output expansion in Japan, Spain, Italy and the
36Indeed, Wagner’s law would predict that governments absorb an increasingly larger share of output as output
increases.
37The unrelatedness of output and revenue ﬂuctuations may be due to the importance of raw materials exports.
38The cyclicality of government spending probably owes to large interest payments in high debt countries, or to
incentives to ”spend the ﬁlled coﬀers of the Treasury”.
39We also experimented with the imposition of theoretical relationships on the data. The robustness of these results
was questionable though.
40The structural budgetary shocks display a variety of persistence. In most European countries the shocks dies out
after two to ﬁve years. In the United States, Japan and Italy however, the dampening of the shock lasts much longer.
17Netherlands, a similar and signiﬁcant response is found to negative budgetary shocks in Austria,
Canada, France and the United States, whereas the reponse is not signiﬁcant in Germany. This
result stands in sharp contrast with the evidence of small Keynesian output eﬀects in the existing
literature on the eﬀects of budgetary policy. It is due to the enforcement of the long term solvency
condition in our identiﬁcation scheme. It is puzzling that the Ricardian eﬀects of budgetary policy
are not related to the debt structure of the respective countries. Keynesian responses are found in
Italy for example. Also, the diﬀerent responses can not be due to government investment, for this
expenditure category has been excluded. Second, a signiﬁcant interest rate response is detected in
Austria. As this country is certainly characterised by a very stable exchange rate regime over the
e n t i r es a m p l e ,i tp o i n t sa to n eﬂaw in our approach. The present identiﬁcation does not account for
possible coordination of budgetary policy shocks, and hence similar responses across countries may
still occur.
With such diﬀerent output responses, this still raises the question as to why we observe interest
rate increases. One may attribute the rise to crowding out and market discipline eﬀects of budget
shocks when revenues do not react in a commensurate way to expenditure shocks, be they positive
or negative. No initial impact on revenues is allowed for in the identiﬁcation scheme, as revenues
are bound to real output. After the initial shock, revenue responses do increase considerably —
albeit not always signiﬁcantly. This is due to automatic stabilisation41 and — partially — the interest
rate increases themselves. In the latter case, government revenues ﬂow in as the tax base of non-
labour income is enlarged. We can not disentangle shocks in tax rates later on however, but such
discretionary responses to correct deviations from the solvency condition seem to be responsible
for more pronounced revenue responses in some countries. Most notably, restoration of solvency in
Austria and France seems to have been achieved by a combination of reductions in government size
and tax increases. On the other hand, results for Japan and the Netherlands indicate the creation of a
debt burden as revenues are not increased in proportion with budget shocks. The explanation for the
interest rate increase is probably more straightforward however, albeit somewhat counterintuitive.
In both cases, budgetary shocks lead to increases in real output and consequently in higher inﬂation.
Central banks thus react indirectly to non-systematic budgetary policy via its eﬀects on output
and inﬂation. It may then be questioned whether there is any informational content then in the
behaviour of budgetary policy as such. It also raises the question as to the approporiate theoretical
framework in order to capture such eﬀects. Nevertheless, the basic result remains that there is no
signiﬁcant response in the countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Our results are hard to compare with previous results in the literature for two reasons. First,
most authors have a much richer speciﬁcation in both expenditures and revenues. This allows a
variety of endogenous responses from expenditure to revenues and vice versa. Interest rate eﬀects
are generally detected in response to revenue shocks. Second, in the present speciﬁcation, deviations
41A notable exception is Germany, which conﬁrms evidence on the weak automatic stabilisation responses of the
German Federal Budget.
18from solvency may have a stronger impact on output, and therefore on interest rates. Note that
our signiﬁcant interest rate responses for the countries with a ﬂexible exchange rate are in line with
the predictions of a standard RBC model with distortionary taxation. The insigniﬁcant results in
countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime are more in line with expectations. Using long term
restrictions, similar insigniﬁcant results for France and EMU are found by Bruneau and De Bandt
(2003). Marcellino (2002) ﬁnds more erratic interest rate responses in the large EMU countries.
What is the eﬀect then of monetary policy shocks on budgetary policy? In the current version of
the paper, the identiﬁcation scheme does not correctly attribute to the real interest rate shocks the
status of monetary policy shocks42. Deviations of the real interest rate are mainly due to the inﬂation
shock being larger than the nominal interest rate shock, which would suggest accomodative monetary
policy. It is thus more appropriately characterised as a short term inﬂation shock, which dies out
relatively quickly (2 years). Its eﬀect is in general weak: it does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect output.
Only in Germany and France do positive output responses result. Even combining output eﬀects
with the nominal interest rate increase, inﬂation does not aﬀect government revenues signiﬁcantly.
Surprisingly, revenues decrease in Japan. On the other hand, inﬂation leads to a pronounced fall in
government expenditure in high debt countries as Italy.
As a ﬁnal point, we present some results on the eﬀects of business cycle shocks. While not of
prime interest, it shows three interesting results. First, the identiﬁcation scheme makes sense. The
shocks dampen over a frequency of 2 to 5 years. In this period, inﬂation increases in proportion43,t o
which monetary policy reacts in a contractionary (and non-accomodative) way. Second, they conﬁrm
the results on the strong automatic stabilisation responses of government revenues44.F i n a l l y ,t h e
responses of government expenditures are more diverse. Explicitly countercyclical budgetary policy
is indicated by signiﬁcant expenditure cuts in Germany and Japan45. On the other hand, signiﬁcant
increases follow in the other major European countries. This could be consistent with two eﬀects
that are not discernible in the current speciﬁcation: (a) the real interest rate increases — steered by
non-accomodative monetary policy — raise the real debt burden; (b) because of political economy
incentives, government proceeds of the Treasury tend to be spent as they ﬂow in.
4.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
There are several ways to assess the robustness of the results. The series decomposition and the
structural shocks out of the common trends model are examined46.
42Inference on the monetary policy shocks would be based on the usual IRF and the (conditional) correlation of
monetary and budgetary policy shocks at leads, but most probably lags. A strong comovement of both shocks would
indicate policy complementarity (or substitutability) in countries with sovereign monetary policy. In (quasi-)monetary
unions, it indicates ﬁne tuning responses of budgetary authorities to exogenous monetary policy shocks.
43Hence, short term demand shocks may be more important than supply shocks.
44Again, they underscore the weak and insigniﬁcant budgetary response in Germany.
45And to a lesser extent in the United States and the Netherlands.
46Explicit stability tests on the parameters of the model (Hansen and Johansen, 1999) are deferred to later analyses.
194.2.1 MODEL FIT
The common trends model provides us with a decomposition of the series into permanent and tran-
sitory components (Eq.(9)). The former can be directly compared to measures of potential output,
cyclically adjusted government balances, core inﬂation and base real interest rates as calculated
by international organisations or obtained by some mechanical data ﬁlters. At this stage, we base
our assessment on the ﬂuctuations of the series around the permanent components only. The real
and the nominal common stochastic trend that we extract from the data series do make sense in
a large number of cases. The transitory output gaps generally correspond to periods of economic
ﬂuctuations. Nevertheless, this result holds only if the sample is of ”adequate” size. This means the
sample size is large enough either to encompass the inﬂationary burst of the seventies or to validate
the imposition of the solvency condition. Also, countries should not have experienced periods of un-
stable budgetary policy to generate reasonable permanent components. This brings us to the wider
issue of stability. Estimation over wider samples (such as in Canada, Germany or the United States)
or restricted samples (Austria and France) produced more stable and signiﬁcant responses. This is
clearly associated to changes in the policy regime. Major movements in the permanent components
are not properly captured by estimation over diﬀerent regimes. Pegging the exchange rate to a low
inﬂation anchor seems especially relevant for the monetary part of the model47, while the transition
to EMU makes an important diﬀerence for budgetary policy in many countries.
4.2.2 FURTHER POLICY SHOCK ANALYSIS
Do the policy shocks make sense (a)? The FEVDs (not reported) shows that the identiﬁcation of the
shocks is relatively robust. The results generally conﬁrm economic priors. At short horizons, most
of the variability in the various series is accounted for by the transitory components. In particular,
variability in expenditure is largely explained by its own past behaviour. This is consistent with
government expenditure being a largely independent process, driven by factors exogenous to the
model. Output variability is accounted for by transitory business cycle shocks, but an important
fraction is determined by the real trend already. Government revenues are mostly related to the
business cycle shocks and this obviously owes to automatic stabilisation. Both price variables are
mainly inﬂuenced by the temporary inﬂation shock. At longer forecast horizons, the variability
in all variables is primarily due to the common trends. However, some puzzling results emerge.
Output variability is never fully accounted for by shocks to the real trend. Inﬂation variability is
to some extent still determined by the short term transitory shocks. The nominal trend is sizeable
in explaining government accounts’ variability. Finally, large uncertainty surrounds the estimates of
all FEVDs.
Do the policy shocks make sense (b)? Since the criticism of Rudebusch (1998), we know that
inference on structural shocks is a dubious exercise as the disturbance series we obtain may depend
47Consider the permanent shift after 1984-1986 in France for example (Fig. 2c).
20on the particular speciﬁcation of the empirical model. It may be too much to require an exact
timing or an appropriate size of policy shocks. Nevertheless, periods of strong deviations away
from or towards solvency should be easily discernible. The following ﬁgures (Fig. 3a-b) display our
structural budgetary policy shocks. Large outliers are exceptional but some periods do come out
clearly. In the United States, the tax cut of 1975 and the Carter-Reagan expansion of the early
eighties is visible. The large Japanese budgetary expansion is also suggested. Strong expansions in
Italy may be associated to the large debt buildup at the end of the eighties. Two classic examples
in the budgetary policy literature do not come to light however. Neither the German Reuniﬁcation,
nor the ”Mitterand” expansion early eighties are evident. On the other hand, the strong budgetary
cuts in 1997 under the Juppé government can be observed. This budgetary retrenchment seems to
be a recurrent phenomenon in all current EMU members under study. Major negative shocks occur
around 1992-1993 and again in the period just before EMU-entry (1996-1998)48. Marcelllino (2002)
concludes from the stability of the budgetary policy shocks that the transition to EMU has mainly
inﬂuenced systematic policy. A preliminary comparison of the volatility of the non-systematic part of
budgetary policy did not indicate any signiﬁcant diﬀerences across exchange rate regimes. However,
the independent disciplining eﬀect of an exchange rate peg and a possible increase in instrument
variability to economic shocks can not be sorted out in this way.
5C O N C L U S I O N
The macroeconomic framework of EMU has been designed for long term stability. The provision of
short term stabilisation may be less adequate however. That this question is not of purely academic
interest is show by the current political and economic reality. This paper empirically analyses
the interaction of stabilisation policies in a monetary union. The SVAR approach is rationalised
on both theoretical grounds as well as the incompleteness of current approaches to analyse policy
interaction. The comparison of dynamic responses to policy shocks across diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes shows that budgetary policy shocks — away from solvency — lead to contractionary monetary
policy. The impact is indirect however as monetary authorities react to the expansionary eﬀects on
output. Moreover, such eﬀects are insigniﬁcant in countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate. In its
current version, the speciﬁcation does not allow us to infer the budgetary response to monetary
policy shocks.
Some caveats have to be kept in mind when assessing these results. Any discussion on the
diﬀerences in budgetary policy in countries — even after controlling for the type of shocks — will run
in the same inferential problems as in the OCA literature. Countries that were ”good” candidates
for ﬁxing exchange rates may not have needed the budgetary instrument anyway. In addition, there
48Fatas and Mihov (2002) study European budgetary policy in the last decade before EMU and do indeed ﬁnd
that the largest budgetary consolidation eﬀorts took place in these two periods. That the latter eﬀect is especially
pronounced in Italy corroborates our evidence.
21is the issue whether OCA criteria are endogenous or not. In that case, the results on the quasi-
monetary union countries may be considered as a lower bound for the eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks on the dynamic response of budgetary policy. Obviously, the Lucas critique will always apply
if we extrapolate evidence to other policy regimes. The ﬁxed exchange rate regime is the closest
approximation to a monetary union as possible. Theoretical models of interaction — as in Beetsma
and Jensen (2002) — therefore need to be extended in the two following ways. First, the qualitative
diﬀerence of EMU is the game theoretic interaction between the single monetary and the several
budgetary authorities. Second, as the present evidence suggests, debt plays an important role in
interaction.
Empirical problems remain however. An immediate issue therefore is to extend the current
speciﬁcation to identify monetary policy shocks. The inclusion of real money balances may be ﬁrst
step. Moreover, we study small open economies and are interested in the policy behaviour relative
to other countries. SVARs and common trends models on open economies have been successfully
applied to monetary policy49. A serious problem is the exact choice of the speciﬁcation: with
limited data availability on budgetary data, too large VARs may result in insigniﬁcant results50.
The structural policy shocks obtained may be fully exploited to examine the behaviour of budgetary
policy in a monetary union. Simulations to assess the actual contribution of budgetary policy to
macroeconomic stability would be the logical end of the exercise.
49We have to keep in mind however that a speciﬁcation in relative ratios isolates asymmetries across countries (Artis
and Ehrmann, 2000).
50An alternative would be to restrict attention to a smaller SVAR in the output gap, inﬂation, a short term interest
rate and the primary deﬁcit to potential output ratio. Identiﬁcation of supply, demand and policy shocks comes from
imposing long term identiﬁcation restrictions.
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= government consumption (non wage)()+ government consumption
(wage) + (capital transfers received by government + other capital transfers
+ net interest payments on government debt - income property paid by government
+ income property received by government+ consumption of government ﬁxed capital)
(NET) REVENUE semi-annual OECD
= social security transfers received by government+ direct taxes
+ indirect taxes+ transfers received by government - TRANSFERS
TRANSFERS semi-annual OECD
= subsidies + social security transfers+ other transfers paid by government
Note: OECD, Economic Outlook, no.71; (a) UK data come from the Treasury; (b) real expenditure
is derived by deﬂating public consumption with the corresponding deﬂator, other components are deﬂated







Austria 1980:2 Netherlands 1983:1
Belgium 1990:1 Portugal 1996:1
Germany 1999:1 Regime
Denmark 1996:1 Norway ﬂoat
Spain 1994:1 Sweden ﬂoat
Finland 1995:1 Great Britain ﬂoat
France 1986:1 Australia ﬂoat
Ireland 1996:1 Canada ﬂoat
Italy 1996:1 United States ﬂoat
Note: (a) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes derives from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002).
27TABLE 2. Standard deviation of output gap, inﬂation and the net government lending ratio()
under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes.
Country Output gap (s.d.) Inﬂation (s.d.) Budget deﬁcit (s.d.)
Before() After() Before After Before After
Austria 1,39 0,83 2.03 1.61 2.10 1.30
Belgium 1.44 1.22 2.71 0.91 3.80 3.90
Germany 1.75 0.78 1.78 0.80 1.40 1.90
Denmark 1.57 0.42 3.95 0.96 — —
Spain 1.24 0.73 4.94 0.86 2.28 2.51
Finland 2.16 1.30 4.35 1.65 3.82 3.80
France 1.02 0.91 3.31 1.18 1.70 1.51
Ireland 1.57 1.97 5.70 1.80 4.01 1.59
Italy 1.43 0.41 5.98 1.28 2.24 2.16
Netherlands 1.31 0.94 2.32 1.44 2.35 2.60
Portugal 2.18 0.66 7.98 0.67 3.82 0.68
average(
) 1.55 0.93 4.01 1.13 2.75 2.12
Norway 1.27 4.23 3.53
Sweden 1.35 3.97 4.67
Great Britain 1.43 5.44 2.63
Australia 1.33 4.30 2.01
Canada 1.12 3.51 3.44
United States 1.51 2.47 2.00
average(
) 1.34 3.99 3.05
Notes: (a) all data are from OECD (see Appendix A): the gap is derived from a mechanical HP-ﬁlter
on real GDP (smoothing parameter  = 100), inﬂation is based on the GDP-deﬂator. The net
government lending for Great Britain is from the Treasury; (b) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes
derives from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002); (c) simple average.
28TABLE 3. Standard deviation of relative() output gap, inﬂation and the net government
lending ratio() before and after entry into a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Country Output gap (s.d.) Inﬂation (s.d.) Budget deﬁcit (s.d.)
Before(
) After(
) Before After Before After
Austria 77 243 61 47 81 60
Belgium 92 26 53 42 102 34
Germany 167 10 64 82 15 59
Denmark 53 15 99 160 ——
()
Spain 131 66 94 82 32 40
Finland 64 13 153 182 207 379
France 70 405 47 34 86 60
Ireland 121 16 117 176 —— ()
Italy 129 44 92 79 168 68
Netherlands 106 223 91 144 93 62














Notes: (a) relative to a real GDP weighted EU average (b) all data are from OECD (see Appendix A):
the gap is derived from a mechanical HP-ﬁlter on real GDP (smoothing parameter  = 100), inﬂation
i sb a s e do nt h eG D P - d e ﬂator; (c) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes derives from Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2002); (d) simple average; (e) Ireland and Denmark have not been included in these EU averages.
T A B L E4 .S a m p l ep e r i o di ne s t i m a t i o no f( E q . ( 1 1 ) ) .
Country SAMPLE Country SAMPLE
Austria 1980:1 - 2001:1 Italy 1970:2 - 2001:1
Germany 1961:2 - 2001:1 Netherlands 1970:2 - 2001:1
Spain 1980:1 - 2001:1 Canada 1967:2 - 2001:1
France 1970:2 - 2001:1 United States 1960:2 - 2001:1
Japan 1971:2 - 2001:1
29APPENDIX C: FIGURES
Fig. 1. Event study: volatility of output gap, inﬂation and budget deﬁcit before and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impulse response to inﬂationary shock.
Fig. 2i. Netherlands (Figures report dynamic impulse responses and the 95% asymptotic error bounds).
39Fig. 3a. Structural budgetary policy shocks.
40Fig. 3b. Structural budgetary policy shocks.
41